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ABSTRACT 
 
Labor economists know that a year of schooling raises earnings but have little evidence 
on the impact of specific courses completed. I identify the impact of math coursework 
on earnings using the differential timing of state-level increases in high school 
graduation requirements  as a source of exogenous variation. The  increased 
requirements induced large  increases in both the completed math coursework and 
earnings of blacks, particularly black males.  Two-sample instrumental variable 
estimates suggest that each additional year of math raised blacks' earnings by 5-9%, 
accounting for a large fraction of  the value of a year of schooling. Closer analysis 
suggests that much of this effect comes from black students who attend  non-white 
schools and who will not attend college.  The earnings impact of additional math 
coursework is robust to changes in empirical specification, is not driven by selection 
into the labor force, and persists when earnings are conditioned on educational 
attainment. The reforms close one fifth of the earnings gap between black and white 
males. Estimates for whites are similar to those of blacks but are much noisier due to the 
reforms' weaker impact on white students' coursework. These results suggest that math 
coursework is an important determinant of the labor market return to schooling, that 
simple minimum requirements largely benefit low-skilled students, and that more 
demanding requirements might be necessary to improve the outcomes of high-skilled 
students. 
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through the Community College Research Center at Columbia University's Teachers College.   Introduction and Previous Literature 
  An extensive literature within labor economics concludes that an additional year 
of schooling raises individuals' labor market earnings by an average of roughly 10-15% 
(Card, 1999; Oreopoulos, 2006). Relatively little is known about whether the content of 
that additional year of schooling affects the returns to that schooling. The problem is 
twofold. First, most data sets used by labor economists contain only the amount of 
completed schooling, not the coursework completed during that schooling. Second, 
even when the coursework completed by students is known, researchers have generally 
been unable to deal with the bias arising from the non-random selection of students into 
courses. I overcome the data limitations by compiling a nationally representative time 
series of high school transcripts that contained detailed information on students' 
completed coursework. I address selection bias by instrumenting students’ coursework 
with differentially timed state-level reforms of high school graduation requirements. 
These reforms, combined with unique data described in more detail below, allow for 
the first clear causal estimates of the impact of coursework on labor market outcomes. 
  This paper builds on a large literature demonstrating the labor market return to a 
year of schooling. Simple correlations between schooling and earnings are likely biased 
by omission of variables such as ability and family background, so researchers have 
sought instrumental variables that provide exogenous variation in individuals' 
schooling attainment. Perhaps the most commonly used instruments are compulsory 
schooling laws that require students to remain in school until a certain age. Changes in 
such laws, or interactions between birth timing and such laws, have provided a rich set 
of results, starting with Angrist and Krueger (1991) and continuing more recently with 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000), Lleras-Muney (2005) and Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens 
(2006). These studies conclude that compulsory schooling laws do increase schooling 
attainment and that this increased attainment in turn improves earnings, mortality 
rates, and the educational progress of the children of those affected by such laws. The 
causal benefit of schooling is thus clear. What is less clear is why schooling attainment has such a large, positive impact on earnings (as well as the other outcomes measured). 
The compulsory schooling laws that serve as instruments in these studies affect only the 
amount of time spent in school. This paper provides the first evidence that compulsory 
changes in the amount of time spent in specific courses can be a significant determinant 
of the labor market return to a year of schooling. 
  Only a few previous studies have attempted to explore the value of specific 
coursework and have met with mixed success. Altonji (1995), Levine and Zimmerman 
(1995), and Rose and Betts (2004) all use longitudinal surveys of high school students to 
track the relation between coursework and labor market outcomes. These papers use 
various techniques to deal with selection bias, including high school fixed effects, 
instrumenting for coursework with average coursework completed at the students' high 
schools, and controlling flexibly for students' measured abilities. Though the results of 
these papers vary substantially, the latter two find that math courses are powerful 
predictors of earnings later in life, at least for some demographic subgroups. The fact 
that these studies reach differing conclusions about the value of specific coursework 
may in  part be attributed to the imperfections in the techniques for dealing with 
selection bias. High school fixed effects do not control for differences in individual 
ability, results from controlling for individual ability directly may depend heavily on 
functional form assumptions, and average high school courseload is not a valid 
instrument as it is almost certainly correlated with other factors (such as the quality of 
the high school's college guidance department) that should directly impact future 
wages. One of the contributions of this paper is to deal with selection bias in a more 
convincing way by employing the exogenous shock of state-level policy changes. 
  Whether specific coursework affects the value of a year of schooling is a critical 
public policy question because it affects both the allocation of scarce public funds 
within educational systems and the extent to which policymakers should view school 
curricula as tools for improving the workforce. This is of particular concern given a 
recent literature that attributes rising income inequality in the U.S. in part to skill-biased technological change, as summarized in Autor and Katz (1999) and given a longer 
historical perspective in Goldin and Katz (2007). One particular version of this theory, 
explored  by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and by Goos and Manning (2007) 
suggests that technology is replacing ``middling'' routinized jobs, thus polarizing the 
workforce into low- and high-skilled non-routinized jobs. There is a sense that a high 
quality educational system should impart to its students skills that increase their 
probability of obtaining high-earning, technologically sophisticated jobs. This was 
certainly the belief of the authors of the report that spurred the reforms central to this 
paper. Whether specific courses are particularly effective in providing good labor 
market opportunities to students is of critical importance given this country's growing 
income inequality. 
  To preview the paper's central results, I find that The increased requirements 
induced large increases in both the completed math coursework and earnings of blacks, 
particularly black males. Two-sample instrumental variable estimates suggest that each 
additional year of math raised blacks' earnings by 5-9%, accounting for a large fraction 
of the value of a year of schooling. Closer analysis suggests that much of this effect 
comes from black students who attend non-white schools and who will not attend 
college.  The earnings impact of additional math coursework is robust to changes in 
empirical specification, is not driven by selection into the labor force, and persists when 
earnings are conditioned on educational attainment. The reforms close one fifth of the 
earnings gap between black and white males. Estimates for whites are similar to those 
of blacks but are much noisier due to the reforms' weaker impact on white students' 
coursework. These results suggest that math coursework is an important determinant of 
the labor market return to schooling, that simple minimum requirements largely benefit 
low-skilled students, and that more demanding requirements might be necessary to 
improve the outcomes of high-skilled students. 
 
Description of Reforms   The increased graduation requirements that serve here as the exogenous source 
of variation in student coursework were prompted largely by the publication in April 
1983 of ``A Nation at Risk'', the final report of President Reagan's National Commission 
on Excellence in Education. The commission had been convened to address perceived 
declines in quality of education received by American high school students. The first 
two sentences of the report read: ``Our Nation is at risk. Our once unchallenged 
preeminence in commerce, industry, science, and technological innovation is being 
overtaken by competitors throughout the world.'' The report continued by mentioning 
Japan, South Korea and Germany as countries making technological advances in 
industries where America had historically been dominant, concluding that ``Learning is 
the indispensable investment  required for success in the 'information age' we are 
entering.'' 
  One of the primary causes of the educational decline cited by the commission 
was that ``Secondary school curricula have been homogenized, diluted, and diffused to 
the point that they no longer have a central purpose.... This curricular smorgasbord, 
combined with extensive student choice, explains a great deal about where we find 
ourselves today.'' Noting that American high school students earned 25% of their 
credits in ``physical and health education, work experience outside the school, remedial 
English and mathematics, and personal service and development courses'', the 
commission proposed that state and local graduation requirements be strengthened 
dramatically. Specifically, the commission recommended that ``all students seeking a 
diploma be required to lay the foundations in the Five New Basics by taking the 
following curriculum during their 4 years of high school: (a) 4 years of English; (b) 3 
years of mathematics; (c) 3 years of science; (d) 3 years of social studies; and (e) one-half 
year of computer science.'' 
  The vast majority of states reacted to the commission's recommendations by 
increasing (or imposing for the first time) the minimum number of years in various 
subjects necessary for a students to receive a high school diploma, though not necessarily to the levels that the commission had recommended. Based on documents 
from the Education Commission for the States, I construct for each state and for each 
graduating class of 1982 through 1994 the minimum number of math, science, social 
studies, English and other courses a student would need to complete in order to receive 
a high school diploma, where ``course'' refers to a full year of study. Though many 
states enacted multiple increases simultaneously, I focus in this paper on the increases 
in math requirements because they are the most common type of reform, because math 
skills are considered a particular weakness of the American educational system, and 
because prior research suggests that math coursework may be particularly important in 
determining wages. I will also show that controlling for other curricular reforms has 
does not substantially change the estimated impacts of the math reforms. 
  Figure 1 shows the timing of the math reforms enacted by the states. Only a 
handful of states enacted reforms applying to classes prior to 1987. The bulk of the 
reforms are roughly evenly split between the classes of 1987, 1988, and 1989, with only 
two states enacting reforms after that period. This timing is explained by state 
legislatures responding relatively quickly to ``A Nation at Risk'' by legislating increased 
graduation requirements in year Y (where Y was generally 1983, 1984, or 1985) to apply 
to students entering high school that year, and thus graduating with the class of Y+4. 
Compared to the class of 1982, the class of 1994 faced higher minimum math 
requirements in 41 of the 51 states in the U.S. 
  Table 1 categorizes states by their pre- and post-reform numbers of math courses 
required for graduation, so that each cell represents a particular type of reform. The 
most common reform is an increase from one to two math courses required, while the 
second most common is an increase from two to three. States in the rightmost cells of 
the top row are those that enacted statewide minimum graduation requirements for the 
first time.   The majority of states that enacted reforms thus set their new minimum at 
two courses, lower than the commission's recommendation. The ten states along the 
diagonal enacted no reforms during this time period.   Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the reforms. Panels (A) and (B) 
show each state's minimum math requirements at the beginning and end of the time 
period in question. In 1982, the vast majority of states allowed students to graduate high 
school with zero or one completed math courses, while only a handful of states required 
a two course minimum and none required three. By 1994, the vast majority of states 
required at least two math courses, and a number required three. Only six states set no 
minimum requirements at that point in time. Panel (C) shows the different timing of the 
reforms, dividing the states into those that reformed earlier (1984-1987) and those that 
reformed later (1988-1990). As will  be explained below, these two time periods 
correspond to those available in the transcript data. There is some geographic 
correlation among the early reforming states, with such states concentrated in the 
southeastern and western parts of the country. To account for this, some of the 
empirical specifications used below will include Census division-specific trends that 
will control for any geographically differing trajectories of different parts of the country. 
  Though most states' reforms were one course increases, some states enacted 
apparently stronger reforms by moving from no statewide minima to two- and three-
course minima. I will exploit only the differential timing of the reforms and not their 
differing magnitudes to achieve identification, for two reasons. First, states that had no 
requirements at the beginning of this time period, such as California, nonetheless had 
very few students actually graduating with no completed math coursework. This is 
likely due to local school districts setting higher minima than required by the state. It is 
thus unclear whether to label California's increase from zero to two courses a stronger 
reform than Virginia's increase from one to two courses. Second, some states issue 
multiple types of high school diplomas that distinguish students by the difficulty of 
their completed coursework. Thus, although I have categorized states by the lowest 
requirements that allow graduation from high school, reforms to higher types of 
diplomas sometimes occurred simultaneously, thus clouding the issue of precisely how strong each state's reform was. The timing of the reforms is, however, less ambiguous 
and, as seen in figure 2, sufficiently varied as to achieve identification. 
 
Data 
  If a single data set existed containing information on high school coursework and 
labor market outcomes for individuals from classes in the 1980s and 1990s, I could use 
the reforms to instrument for coursework and thus derive unbiased estimates of the 
impact of coursework on earnings. Unfortunately, there does not exist a single data set 
containing all of this information in a way that allows me to exploit the differential 
timing of the reforms spurred by ``A Nation at Risk''. The few longitudinal studies that 
follow students from high school to the labor market (such as the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, High School and Beyond, and the National Education Longitudinal 
Study) cover too few graduating classes to be useful, while most traditional data sets 
used by labor economists (the Current Population Survey, the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics) contain little or no information on high school coursework. 
  I solve this problem by exploiting two separate data sources, a time series of 
transcript studies that I construct and Census data containing labor market outcomes. 
The transcript data allow estimation of a first stage impact of the reforms on 
coursework, while the Census data allows estimation of the reduced form impact of the 
reforms on earnings. Combining these estimates through two-sample instrumental 
variables (TSIV), as will be described in detail below, generates the impact of 
coursework on earnings. The following two subsections describe the data sets in more 
detail. 
 
Transcript Data 
  The primary challenge in determining whether these reforms affected students' 
coursework is that no data set contains detailed information on students' coursework on 
a class-by-class and state-by-state basis. The federal government does, however, collect a national sample of high school transcripts every few years through the National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). One of the earliest such collections occurred for 
the class of 1982, with the High School and Beyond Survey (HSB). Three more waves 
followed for the classes of 1987, 1990 and 1994, in transcript studies associated with the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). For each of these waves, NCES 
collects from high schools around the country both a set of students' transcripts, which 
list the specific courses students have completed, as well as  each high school's 
handbook of course descriptions. The latter allows NCES to uniformly code courses that 
might otherwise have different names in different high schools, according to a scheme 
known as the Secondary School Taxonomy. 
  I compile these four transcript collections into a single data set of roughly 70,000 
students for whom I can identify their state of high school attendance and the class with 
which they graduated.1
                                                           
1 To my knowledge, this is the first such use of this data, perhaps because accessing the 
state identifiers requires obtaining a restricted-use license from NCES. This license in 
turn requires users to access the data on a pre-approved site that contains a secured 
computer. I am grateful to Professor Thomas Bailey and Matthew Heidelberg at the 
Community College Research Center at Teachers College, Columbia University, for 
allowing me to use the data through their site. 
 The timing of the four waves implies that the 1982 wave is a 
purely pre-reform sample, the 1987 wave is a mixture of states that had and had not yet 
enacted reforms, and the 1990 and 1994 waves are post-reform samples. Because the 
1990 and 1994 waves include only high school graduates, I exclude high school 
dropouts from the earlier waves in order to make the sample comparable over time. I 
also exclude Hispanic students because using state of birth as a proxy for state of high 
school in the Census data will eliminate the large fraction of Hispanic respondents born 
in foreign countries.  The subsequent analysis will thus focus on four separate 
demographic groups (black males, black females, white males and white females) 
because the reforms had differential impacts on these groups' coursework and earnings.   For each high school graduate of the classes of 1982, 1987, 1990 and 1994, the 
transcript data allow construction of the number of courses for which the student 
received credit in various subject areas.2
  Panel (A) of table 2 shows the mean completed coursework for each group over 
this entire time period. The top row reveals that black students completed nearly 
identical amounts of math coursework as white students, with each group averaging 
slightly more than three courses. The composition of that coursework differed greatly, 
however, between black and white students, with black students and particularly black 
males completing more of their coursework in basic math. This suggests that black 
students are exposed to less rigorous math curricula than white students, have lower 
math skills than white students, or some combination of those two factors. Panel (A) 
also shows that over this time period, only 38% of black students complete at least four 
years of math, compared to 43% of white students. Black students also complete fewer 
total credits in other courses. All of these facts suggest substantial differences in the 
high school curricula to which black and white students are exposed. Completing a 
high school degree may thus imply substantial skill differences between these two 
populations, hence the importance of exploring the returns to not only years of 
schooling but also to specific coursework. 
 For simplicity, I divide math courses into two 
categories, which I label basic and advanced. Basic courses are those with titles such as 
vocational mathematics, consumer mathematics, basic mathematics, special education 
mathematics and pre-algebra. Advanced courses include algebra I, geometry, algebra II, 
pre-calculus, calculus and statistics. I also compute the total number of completed 
courses in all other subjects. 
 
Census Data 
                                                           
2 NCES provides a standardized unit of credit, called a Carnegie unit, that represents a 
standard full-year course.   Because the NAEP waves of the transcript data do not follow students beyond 
high school to observe later outcomes, I turn to the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample 
(PUMS) of the 2000 Census, which aims to survey 1 out of every 20 Americans.3 
Outcomes of interest contained in PUMS include respondents' educational attainment, 
labor force participation, earnings in the past year (i.e. 1999), and occupation. 
Educational attainment is coded into four categories: high school dropouts, high school 
graduates, those who attended some college but have not earned a degree, and those 
who have a college degree (from a two- or four-year college). I recode incomes below 
$5,000 and above $150,000 as missing to prevent outliers from unduly influencing the 
results below. Respondents also report their occupation, which PUMS codes into nearly 
500 categories according to the Standard Occupational Classification system. I merge 
these occupations with a normalized measure of the mathematical skill required for 
each occupation, which I derive from characteristics contained in the federal 
government's Occupational Network Database (O-Net 4.0).4
  Unlike the transcript data, the Census data does not contain information on the 
state in which respondents attended high school. I therefore assume that respondents 
attended high school in their reported states of birth and that they graduated in the 
class of the year they turned 18 (the median and modal graduation age for Americans). 
  For simplicity, I then 
divide occupations into those in the upper half of the mathematical skill distribution, 
which I label ``skilled'' occupations, and those in the lower half, which I label 
``unskilled''. 
                                                           
3 I accessed the data through http://usa.ipums.org/usa/, which provides a user-friendly 
interface and excellent documentation. 
4 Specifically, O-Net contains for each occupation four measures of the importance of 
math, rated on a scale of one to five. These measures are the knowledge of mathematics, 
the skill of mathematics, the ability of mathematical reasoning, and the ability of 
number facility. The distinction between these categories is unclear and correlation 
between them is quite high, so I simply take the average of the four scores. For comparability to the transcript data, I then limit the sample to those students who 
turned 18 between 1982 and 1994. The sample thus consists of respondents who are 
between 24 and 36 years of age in 2000. I avoid assigning state of high school attendance 
by state of current residence due to the potential for selection bias that might arise from 
high earning individuals migrating to states with improved educational systems. State 
of birth, though obviously an imperfect measure of state of high school, is at least 
exogenous to the reforms studied here.5
  Panel (B) of table 2 shows the mean characteristics of the PUMS sample. I limit 
the sample to those students who are at least high school graduates to make the sample 
comparable to the transcript sample. This procedure excludes 23% of black males, 17% 
of black females, and roughly 10% of white respondents. I show later that this does not 
create selection bias but nonetheless run many of the subsequent regressions both 
excluding and including high school dropouts. Even with the sample limited to those 
with at least a high school degree, large educational disparities are immediately obvious 
between black and white students and even between black males and females. 
Conditional on having a high school degree, black students (and particularly black 
males) are roughly half as likely to be college graduates as their white counterparts. 
Though black and white women have similar labor force participation, only 77% of 
black males report being in the labor force relative to 92% of white males. Only 79% of 
black males report any earnings from the previous year, compared to 92% of white 
  As mentioned previously, because an 
extremely large fraction of Hispanic respondents are born outside of the U.S., this 
procedure forces me to exclude Hispanic students from the analysis. 
                                                           
5 Rough estimates from the 1990 PUMS suggest that over 75% of high school age 
students reside in their state of birth, so that measurement error is not overwhelmingly 
large. Assigning high school class based on current age also introduces measurement 
error, as some students graduate high school at earlier or later ages. These facts should 
bias the subsequent results toward zero, suggesting that I may be underestimating the 
impacts of these reforms on earnings. males. Conditional on reporting earnings from the previous year, blacks earn $6,000 less 
than whites, with the gap between black and white males closer to $8,000. 
  Finally, the measure of occupational math skill suggests that blacks and 
particularly black  males are in less skilled occupations relative to their white 
counterparts. Only 36% of black males in the sample are in skilled occupations relative 
to 48% of white males, as defined by the measure of mathematical skill mentioned 
above. Part of this disparity is clearly due to educational differences, but even 
conditional on educational attainment blacks and particularly black males are 
significantly less likely to be in skilled occupations than whites. This can been seen in 
figure 3, in which panel (A) shows the overall fraction of each subgroup in a skilled 
occupation (the same fraction shown in the final row of table 2). Panels (B), (C) and (D) 
show that even conditional on education, black males are 5-10% percentage points less 
likely to be in skilled occupations than white males, and a similar or even larger gap 
appears between black and white females. Assuming individuals enter occupations in 
which they have comparative advantages, these figures suggest that blacks are at a 
serious disadvantage with regard to the skills required by these occupations. Between 
education, occupation and earnings, the overall picture is thus a consistent one of blacks 
disadvantaged relative to whites and black males particularly disadvantaged. 
 
Impact of Reforms on Coursework 
 
Identification Strategy 
  As the previous literature on this topic has shown, simply comparing the 
earnings of individuals with differing amounts of math coursework is likely to lead to 
biased estimates of the impact of this coursework, due to omitted variables such as 
ability. Previous papers have dealt with this by using instrumental variables or fixed 
effects techniques that suffer from the flaws mentioned previously. I use the timing of 
the math reforms induced by ``A Nation at Risk'' as a source of exogenous variation in the math coursework students complete, thus avoiding the bias potentially plaguing 
previous estimates. Identification will be achieved through the within-state changes in 
math coursework, controlling for year-specific nationwide shocks. This means that 
identification comes from the comparison of states whose increased requirements 
applied to the class of 1987 (or earlier) to those states who increased requirements 
applied to the classes of 1988-1990. 
  One potential concern with this strategy is that states enacting earlier reforms 
may be fundamentally different than states enacting later reforms, particularly with 
regard to their educational systems. If, for example, states are more likely to pass 
reforms early if their students have low levels of completed math coursework, then the 
estimates below might represent mean reversion rather than a true causal impact of the 
reforms. To show that the date of the reforms seems plausibly exogenous to the math 
coursework in a given state, columns (1) through (3) of Table 3 shows the mean initial 
completed coursework (in 1982) of states by the date of their reform. The top row of 
panel (A) reveals that black students completed 2.77 math courses in early-reforming 
states while black students in later-reforming states completed 2.81 on average, a 
statistically insignificant difference as the p-value in column (4) demonstrates. Nor was 
initial coursework in those state that never enacted reforms statistically different from 
the later reforming states, as shown in column (5). The next two rows show the fraction 
of students in 1982 who fell below the new, higher minimum requirements that the state 
would later set were nearly identical in early- and later-reforming states, as were the 
average number of courses by which such students failed to meet that new minimum. 
The final row of panel (A) shows that earnings in early and later reforming states were 
quite similar for black graduates of the class of 1982, though the non-reforming states 
did have higher mean incomes. As a result, the empirical analysis below will show 
results both including and excluding the non-reforming states. Panel (B) suggests 
roughly similar results for white students, though mean coursework in 1982 does differ significantly by reform wave, so that mean reversion may be a concern for white 
students.  
  Initial evidence that the reform timing is clearly associated with sharp breaks in 
both completed coursework and earnings for black students comes from figure 4. 
Panels (A) and (B) graph mean completed coursework over time, with early and later 
reforming states shown separately. For simplicity, non-reforming states have been 
omitted here. Panel (A) shows that, for black students, completed math coursework rose 
most sharply in the early time period for early reforming states and the later time 
period for later reforming states. Overall, black students' completed a remarkable 0.4 
more math courses in 1994 than they did in 1982, a nearly 15% increase. Panel (B) 
repeats the exercise for white students, who show even larger increases in math 
coursework but somewhat less connection to the timing of the reforms. 
  Panels (C) and (D) show similar results with the logarithm of annual earnings as 
the outcome. In panel (C), black students in the class of 1982 have nearly identical 
earnings in early and later reforming states. A gap opens up, however, for classes in the 
mid-1980s, where respondents from early reforming states in those classes earn more 
than their classmates in later reforming states. By 1990, this gap has vanished. In panel 
(D), no such gap is observable for white students. Taken as a whole, these panels 
strongly suggest that the math reforms had large impacts on both the coursework and 
earnings of blacks and smaller or no impacts on those of whites. 
To rigorously quantify the impacts of the reforms, I run regressions of the form 
isc s c sc isc ε ν µ β α + + + + = MathReform Courses  
where Courses represents the number of courses completed by individual i in state s in 
class c and MathReform indicates whether that individual was subject to an increased 
math requirement. Class and state fixed effects are included so that β identifies the 
within-state effect of a reform to math requirements, controlling for nationwide class-
specific shocks.  To that baseline specification I sequentially add further controls for other state-
level education policies and economic conditions. These regressions thus have the form 
isc s c sc sc isc ε ν µ φ β α + + + + + = EdPolicy MathReform Courses  
and 
isc s c d sc sc sc isc c ε ν µ κ δ φ β α + + + + + + + = Economy EdPolicy MathReform Courses  
Here, EdPolicy includes the total number of other course requirements, an indicator for 
an exit exam requirement, and per-student expenditures and student-teacher ratios for 
state s and class c.6 Economy includes the state-level poverty and unemployment rates 
and κ is a vector of linear time trends by Census division d.7
 
 Heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors are clustered by state to allow for within-state serial correlation in the 
error terms, a concern raised by the now well-known result of Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan (2004). 
Empirical Results 
  Panel (A) of table 4 contains the central results for the impact of the reforms on 
completed coursework. The reforms had large and highly statistically significant 
impacts on black students, inducing black males to complete 0.40 more math courses 
and black females to complete 0.28 more math courses. For black males, this increase 
was roughly evenly split between basic and advanced courses, while for black women 
advanced courses accounted for more than half of the increase. The impact of the 
reforms is less strong on white students, inducing a 0.19 course rise for white males and 
a statistically insignificant 0.10 course rise for white females (though white females do 
                                                           
6 Though some states did introduce exit exams during this time period, the timing of 
such reforms turns out to be largely uncorrelated with the math reforms of interest, so 
that inclusion of the exit exam requirement has little impact on any of the subsequent 
estimates. 
7 Ideally, I would control for state-specific trends, but the four transcript waves 
represent too few data points per state with which to estimate such trends. show a statistically significant 0.12 increase in basic  math). The reforms thus had 
powerful impacts on black students, particularly males, smaller impacts on white 
males, and little impact on white females' coursework. Panel (A) will serve as the first-
stage estimates of the impact of the reforms on students' coursework. The reforms are 
thus strong instruments for black students' coursework (with F-statistics greater than 
the value of 10 recommended by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995)), but less so for white 
students. As such, I will argue that the subsequent estimates of the impact of math 
courses on earnings for blacks are clear, while those for white students are at best 
suggestive. 
  The bottom half of panel (A) shows the impact of the reforms on the distribution 
of math courses completed by students. Interestingly, much of the increase in 
coursework is attributable to large (18 percentage point) drops in the number of black 
students completing two or fewer math courses. Two thirds (12 percentage points) of 
those students take a full four years of more of math as a result of the reforms, far above 
the minima set by the state. This suggests that the state reforms induced schools to 
emphasize or require amounts of math coursework beyond the state minima, perhaps 
because schools did not want to be seen as simply fulfilling the bare minimum 
requirements themselves.8
  Panel (B) shows how the estimated impacts of the math reforms change if other 
education policy controls are added, if economic controls and trends are added, or if the 
sample excludes those states that did not pass reforms. The general results discussed 
above hold in all four specifications. Black students are strongly affected by the reforms, 
with black males more strongly affected. White males are more weakly affected and 
 Finally, the last row of panel (A) shows that the timing of the 
math reforms is not associated with statistically significant increases in the total amount 
of non-math coursework, implying that the reforms worked primarily through 
increased math coursework. 
                                                           
8 This is yet another reason not to use the “strength” of the state reforms as the exogenous variable, as many 
schools seem to have pushed students beyond the specific state requirements. white females are barely affected if at all. Panel (C) and (D) apply the four specifications 
to basic and advanced math. Again, the overall picture changes little with each 
specification. Black males’ increased coursework was roughly split between basic and 
advanced courses, while black females’ increased coursework is generally dominated 
by advanced coursework, particularly in the specification with the maximum number of 
additional controls. 
  Table 5 explores the impact of these reforms by school type. In panel (A), I divide 
schools into white and non-white schools, where the former are defined as those 
schools in which more than 80% of the transcripts were collected from white students.9
 
 
Though the reforms have some impact on students in white schools, the bulk of the 
impact for both black and white students come from those students in non-white 
schools. Assuming that racial composition is a good proxy for socioeconomic status, this 
unsurprisingly suggests that the reforms had their largest impact on the most 
disadvantaged schools. Panel (B) runs a similar analysis, dividing schools into public 
and private, the latter of which constitute roughly 10% of the sample. Again, 
unsurprisingly, the reforms had much larger impacts on public schools, which were 
legally bound by the state requirements than on private schools, which were not. 
Impact of Reforms on Earnings 
 
Identification Strategy 
  To quantify the impacts of the reforms on earnings, I run regressions on the 
Census data identical in form to those used with the transcript data, but with earnings 
as the dependent variable. The estimating equations thus look like: 
isc s c sc isc ε ν µ β α + + + + = MathReform s) Ln(earning  
                                                           
9 Other measures of school racial and socioeconomic composition are not comparable 
across the different waves of transcript data. isc s c sc sc isc ε ν µ φ β α + + + + + = EdPolicy MathReform s) Ln(earning  
isc s c d sc sc sc isc c ε ν µ κ δ φ β α + + + + + + + = Economy EdPolicy MathReform s) Ln(earning
 
where the dependent variable represents the logarithm of annual earnings of individual 
i whom I have assigned as a high school student in state s and class c. All independent 
variables are the same as in the transcript regressions, so that the impact of the reforms 
is identified by within-state changes in earnings, controlling for class-specific shocks. 
  Note that these regressions are not typical Mincer earnings regressions because 
they control neither for educational attainment nor for experience explicitly. I omit 
educational attainment here in order to match covariates with the transcript data, which 
do not contain educational attainment of individuals beyond high school. Labor market 
experience is approximated by the class fixed effects, which are equivalent to 
controlling for a nationwide age profile in earnings. The TSIV technique used below 
necessitates that both stages of estimation involve the same covariates, hence the 
parsimonious form of the above regressions. The previous regressions (of coursework 
on reforms) will provide the first stage for the TSIV estimates while these regressions 
(of earnings on reforms) will act as the reduced form. 
 
Empirical Results 
  Table 6 shows the impact of the reforms on the annual earnings of each 
demographic group. Here the sample has been limited to high school graduates in 
order to best match the sample represented in the transcript data. In the baseline 
specification, the reforms raise black males' earnings by 3.2% and black females 
earnings by 2.2%, for a combined impact of 2.6%. These results are all highly 
statistically significant. The impact on white males is a practically large but statistically 
insignificant 1.6%, while white females experience no earnings impact. What is perhaps 
most notable about the coefficients from the baseline specification is they look 
remarkably similar in relative magnitude to the impacts of the reforms on math coursework, with the strongest impact on black males, a strong but smaller impact on 
black females, a weaker impact on white males, and no impact on white females. 
  The estimated impact of the reforms on earnings are fairly stable across 
specifications. Including additional education policy controls reduces the reforms’ 
impacts slightly. Adding the economic controls and trends further reduces the reforms’ 
impacts, particularly for black females and white males. Even with all of these 
additional controls, the impact of the reforms on black males’ earnings is still a high 
significant 2.1% increase. Removing the non-reforming states also reduces the apparent 
impact of the reforms, particularly for whites, though even so the coefficient on black 
earnings is still a significant 1.9%. The fifth row of the table limits the Census sample to 
only students from the same classes as the transcript data contain (1982, 1987, 1990 and 
1994). Doing this increases the estimated impacts on blacks’ earnings. The final row of 
the table adds back to the sample the high school dropouts previously excluded, the 
result of which is to leave the estimated impact on blacks’ earnings largely unchanged. 
This suggests the impact is not being driven by selection into the high school graduate 
sample. 
 
Two-Sample Instrumental Variables 
If the observed increased earnings can be attributed solely to the additional math 
coursework completed by students subject to the reforms, then combining the results of 
tables 4 and 6 allows me to estimate the return to a year of math coursework. To 
combine the estimates from the first-stage equations in table 4 with the reduced-form 
equations in table 6, I turn to the two-sample instrumental variable technique first 
introduced by Angrist and Krueger (1992).10
                                                           
10 Subsequent papers that have used TSIV include Currie and Yelowitz (2000), who 
study the impact of public housing on children's outcomes, and Dee and Evans (2003), 
who study the impact of alcohol consumption on educational attainment. 
  TSIV can be used when one data set contains the instrument (the reforms) and endogenous regressor (coursework) and the 
other data set contains the instrument (the reforms) and outcome of interest (earnings). 
Both data sets must also share any other covariates to be included in the regressions. In 
this case, a two-stage least squares procedure can be used, just as in usual IV estimation, 
but with the first-stage estimates coming from a different data set than the second-stage 
estimates. Practically, this means using the transcript data to estimate the amount of 
coursework completed by students in each class and state and then imputing those 
estimates to individuals in the Census data. Standard errors must then be adjusted to 
account for the error introduced by imputation. 
These two-sample instrumental variables estimates are presented in Table 7, 
which basically shows the ratio of the coefficients from those two previous tables. The 
baseline specification suggests that each additional year of math coursework raised 
blacks’ earnings by roughly 8%, with statistically indistinguishable impacts on males 
and females. Across the various specifications, the estimated return to blacks of an 
additional year of math coursework ranges from 4.5% to 9.3% and is always statistically 
significant. Separate estimates for black males and females are at least marginally 
significant in 11 of the 12 regressions and are never statistically distinguishable from 
each other. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients for white males range from 3.1% to 
10.8% but are only marginally significant in two of the six specifications, an 
unsurprising result given the relatively weak impact of the reforms on white males’ 
coursework. The noisy estimates for  white females range from -3.0% to 6.7%, an 
unsurprising result given that the first stage is quite weak for such students. 
  The TSIV estimates imply that blacks benefitted substantially from the additional 
math courses they were induced to take by these reforms. Each class is estimated on 
average to raise blacks' earnings by around 8%. Given that 15% is usually an upper 
estimate for the value of a year of schooling, these results imply that math coursework 
can a substantial portion of that value, at least for blacks. The results for white males are of the same general magnitude but are only suggestive given the weakness of the 
instrument for them. 
 
Labor Force Attachment and Human Capital 
  One concern about these results, particularly for blacks, is that the observed 
earnings increases associated with the reforms could be driven by selection into the 
labor force. If, for example, these reforms induced low-earning blacks to drop out of 
high school or out of the labor market, then the earnings of the remaining workers 
would rise mechanically and not due to any improvement in individual outcomes. To 
check whether this is the case, table 8 explores the impact of the reforms on various 
measures of educational attainment and labor force attachment. The columns alternate 
between samples including all states and samples excluding non-reforming states, to 
test the robustness of the results.  
  Panel (A) focuses on educational attainment. The theoretical impact of increased 
graduation requirements on educational attainment is ambiguous. More stringent 
requirements may raise dropout rates as higher proportions of students find themselves 
unable to meet the new requirements. Conversely, better academic preparation in high 
school may allow students to succeed in pursuing college educations. The former 
theory is supported by Dee and Jacob (2006), who find that introduction of exit exam 
requirements raise dropout rates particularly among black students, and by Lillard and 
DeCicca (2001), who argue that increased total course requirements have a similar 
impact. The first row of panel (A) suggests that the reforms are not associated in any 
practically or statistically significant way with the proportion of black respondents 
dropping out of high school.11
                                                           
11 Though not shown here, the coefficient on an exit exam requirement, when included, is strongly predictive of 
higher dropout rates among blacks, replicating the results of Dee and Jacob (2006). 
 Nor is there any robust relationship between the reforms 
and other measures of educational attainment, for both whites and blacks. This suggests 
that selection into the high school graduate sample can not be driving the earnings results and also that increased educational attainment is not likely the primary channel 
driving those results. 
  In panel (B), which limits the sample to the high school graduates considered in 
previous tables, there is no indication that the reforms are associated with changed 
labor force participation rates, as measured by the probability or reporting earnings or 
the employment rate. Selection on this margin is thus unlikely to be driving the 
earnings results for blacks. The only slightly odd result here is that the reforms seem 
associated with a substantial 1.7 percentage point drop in the number of white females 
reporting earnings, though the result disappears when non-reforming states are 
excluded. Though this association is almost certainly spurious, it does suggest that the 
results for white females’ earnings may be biased by selection into the labor force. 
  Finally, panel (C) explores the impact of the reforms on occupational skill. 
Though none of the results is statistically significant, it is at least suggestive that the 
coefficients on black males are  substantially larger than those on any other 
demographic group. Overall, this table suggests both that selection bias is not driving 
the earnings results and that neither educational attainment nor occupational choice are 
strongly associated with the reforms. 
  Table 9 explicitly explores the impact of educational attainment on these results. 
Panel (A) uses the full Census sample including high school dropouts, whereas panel 
(B) is limited to those with at least a high school degree. The first row of each panel runs 
the baseline specification as in table 6. The second row adds the full set of interactions 
between four education levels (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college 
and college degree) and class to fully control for both education and experience levels. 
These are thus closer to a traditional Mincer regression. The bottom portion of each 
panel retains those education and experience controls, interacting the math reforms 
with different education levels to study whether the impact of the reforms is 
heterogeneous.   The top row of panel (A) shows that in most specifications, inclusion of the high 
school dropouts either slightly decreases the estimated impacts of the reforms or has 
little effect. In the specification where the reforms are interacted with education level, 
two patterns emerge. For black males, the reforms have no impact on high school 
dropouts, the largest impact on high school graduates, and smaller, statistically 
insignificant impacts on those with further education. For black females, the results 
consistent across specifications are the reforms’ moderate and statistically insignificant 
impact on high school graduates and a larger and sometimes significant impact on 
those with college degrees. The fact that high school dropouts seem unaffected by the 
reforms is reassuring, as there is no particular reason to believe that the coursework of 
such students should be changed by increased graduation requirements. That the 
impact on black males is largest for high school graduates is also reassuring, as the 
students most affected by such increased minimum requirements are presumably those 
with the lowest probability of continuing on to higher education. That black female 
college graduates see an earnings increase may be attributable to the increased 
advanced coursework completed by such students, though it is impossible to test this 
specific hypothesis. 
  Panel (B) shows that the above results are basically unchanged when the sample 
is limited to high school graduates. The second row of each panel should also be noted, 
as they suggest that curricular reforms have an earnings impact even conditional on 
educational attainment and experience, further pointing to the potential shortcoming of 
traditional Mincer regressions that ignore differences in the quality of schooling. 
 
Racial Gaps 
  The analysis to this point has focused on black and white students separately, so 
the final table explores whether these math reforms had an impact on the racial gaps in 
coursework and earnings between men and women. Each panel shows results, 
separately for males and females, of regressing given outcomes on a reform indicator, a black indicator and the interaction of the two, as well as the usual state and class fixed 
effects. The coefficients on the reform indicator measure the mean impact of the 
reforms, while the coefficients on the interaction measure any additional impact of the 
reforms on blacks. The black indicator thus measures the within-state race gap. 
  Column (1) of panel (A) shows that the reforms raised average math coursework 
for males by 0.19 courses, but that the impact was nearly twice as strong for black males 
(and additional 0.14 courses). This additional impact thus closed roughly two-thirds of 
the 0.22 course gap between white and black males in the same state. Omitting non-
reforming states in column (2) does not substantially change these conclusions. 
Columns (3) and (4) show that the within-state gap in advanced coursework was a 
staggering 0.7-0.8 courses and that reforms closed up to a quarter of that gap. Columns 
(5) and (6) show that, conditional on education and experience, the within-state gap 
between white and black males was 22% and the reforms closed 4%, or nearly a fifth of 
that gap. Similarly, the reforms seemed to have closed about a fifth to a third of the 
within-state occupational skill gap. 
  In contrast, panel (B) suggests that the reforms closed relatively little if any of the 
math coursework gap between black and white females. Oddly, the reforms seem to 
have widened the earnings gap between the two groups, though this result is likely due 
to selection bias from the spurious correlation between the reforms and white females' 
labor participation rates, as noted in Table 8. As with males, the reforms do seem to 
have closed some portion of the occupation skill gap between black and white females. 
   
   
Conclusion 
  This paper presents strong evidence that the specific coursework completed 
during a year of schooling has a significant impact on the labor market return to that 
year of schooling. For blacks, particularly males, increased graduation requirements 
induced more completion of math courses, which in turn led to significantly higher earnings. The reforms also closed some of the occupational skill gap between blacks and 
whites. In this sense, the curricular reforms succeeded at least somewhat in achieving 
the curricular improvement envisioned by the authors of ``A Nation at Risk'', causing 
black students to leave high school with better mathematical preparation. 
  The increased graduation requirements studied here did not, however, have 
much impact on the majority of students. In this sense they were a failure, given that 
the reforms had been suggested as a means to increase the nation's educational and 
technological competitiveness on the world stage. There is little evidence that higher 
minimum courseloads improved the productivity of most workers or their capacity to 
enter the math-intensive occupations that preoccupied the authors of ``A Nation at 
Risk''. These increased requirements did not appear to produce any additional rocket 
scientists. 
  There are two likely explanations for this. First, the new minimum requirements 
set by most states were relatively low, and most students were already completing 
relatively high numbers of math courses even prior to the reforms. Second, the 
graduation requirements generally specified only the number of courses necessary and 
not the minimum set of skills students would need in order to graduate. As such, the 
reforms focused on the amount of time spent in class rather than the specific content 
learned. Students could fulfill the requirements by taking a series of low-level math 
courses. Schools could enroll students in classes with advanced titles without 
guaranteeing that any actual objective standards were being met in those classes. For 
low-skilled groups of students, such as black males, additional low-quality courses may 
have had value, but high-skilled students would have benefited little from these types 
of courses. 
  A subsequent generation of reforms, beginning with exit exam requirements and 
continuing with the No Child Left Behind Act, has moved beyond simple measurement 
of time spent in class to measurement of students' skills and academic achievement. 
This renewed focus on student capabilities may come closer to achieving the goals envisioned a quarter of a century ago by the authors of ``A Nation at Risk'', and will 
provide rich avenues for future research. 
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   Figure 4: Coursework and Earnings by Reform Wave 
 
   Table 1: State Reforms to Minimum Math Requirements 
 
   Table 2: Summary Statistics 
                    
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
All  Black  Black  All  White  White 
   blacks  males  females  whites  males  females 
(A) Transcript data 
           
              Math courses  3.09  3.08  3.11  3.18  3.20  3.16 
    Basic math  1.27  1.37  1.18  0.75  0.82  0.68 
    Advanced math  1.82  1.70  1.93  2.43  2.38  2.47 
              Math courses = 2  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.22  0.22  0.22 
Math courses = 3  0.40  0.40  0.39  0.35  0.33  0.36 
Math courses ≥ 4  0.38  0.37  0.38  0.43  0.45  0.42 
              Non-math courses  19.61  19.30  19.89  20.34  20.11  20.57 
              N   11,850  5,470  6,380  54,000  26,640  27,360 
              (B) Census data 
           
              All high school graduates 
           
              High school graduate  0.42  0.48  0.38  0.31  0.34  0.29 
College, no degree  0.34  0.31  0.35  0.27  0.27  0.27 
College degree  0.24  0.21  0.27  0.42  0.39  0.44 
              In labor force  0.78  0.77  0.79  0.85  0.92  0.78 
Employed  0.71  0.71  0.72  0.82  0.89  0.76 
Positive earnings  0.78  0.79  0.78  0.84  0.92  0.76 
              With positive earnings 
           
              Annual earnings  25,841  28,478  23,691  32,065  36,791  26,606 
Occupational math skill  2.82  2.70  2.92  2.98  2.90  3.07 
Skilled occupation  0.43  0.36  0.49  0.53  0.48  0.58 
              N   209,759  93,439  116,320  1,429,439  699,458  729,981 
              Notes: In panel (A), sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 to comply with the 
NCES restricted-use data license. Panel (B) limits the Census sample to those who 
completed at least a high school degree. This excludes 23% of black males, 17% of 
black females, 11% of white males and 8% of white females. 
   Table 3: Class of 1982 Outcomes, by Math Reform Wave 
                    
   (1)  (2)  (3)     (4)  (5) 
 
Math reform wave 
 
 p-value   
   1984-87  1988-90  Never      (1)=(2)  (2)=(3) 
(A) Blacks 
           
              Math courses  2.77  2.81  2.86 
 
0.54  0.28 
Fraction below new minimum  0.27  0.26 
   
0.61 
  Extent below new minimum  0.93  1.01 
   
0.20 
  Ln(annual earnings)  10.06  10.07  10.21 
 
0.64  0.00 
              (B) Whites 
           
              Math courses  2.70  2.84  2.91 
 
0.00  0.00 
Fraction below new minimum  0.25  0.25 
   
0.91 
  Extent below new minimum  1.00  0.97 
   
0.34 
  Ln(annual earnings)  10.30  10.29  10.38     0.75  0.00 
              Notes: Columns (1)-(3) show mean values for high school graduates of the class of 1982, by 
math reform wave. Columns (4) and (5) show p-values resulting from t-tests of the equality of 
those means. 
 
   Table 4: First-Stage Impact of Math Reforms on Coursework 
                 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
All  Black  Black  All  White  White 
   blacks  males  females  whites  males  females 
(A) Baseline specification 
           
Math courses  0.338***  0.398***  0.281***  0.140**  0.186**  0.100 
 
(0.093)  (0.116)  (0.085)  (0.065)  (0.078)  (0.065) 
    Basic math  0.137  0.184*  0.105  0.103**  0.091  0.116** 
 
(0.094)  (0.097)  (0.109)  (0.045)  (0.055)  (0.047) 
    Advanced math  0.201*  0.214*  0.177  0.038  0.095  -0.016 
 
(0.116)  (0.124)  (0.123)  (0.084)  (0.096)  (0.089) 
Math courses ≤ 2  -0.177***  -0.196***  -0.160***  -0.083***  -0.098***  -0.071*** 
 
(0.032)  (0.040)  (0.033)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.024) 
Math courses = 3  0.059**  0.043  0.072**  0.040*  0.032  0.050** 
 
(0.028)  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.020) 
Math courses ≥ 4  0.118***  0.153***  0.087**  0.043  0.066**  0.021 
 
(0.038)  (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.030)  (0.033)  (0.031) 
Non-math courses  0.348  0.378  0.310  0.065  -0.097  0.243 
 
(0.397)  (0.330)  (0.508)  (0.280)  (0.317)  (0.279) 
(B) Math courses 
           
Baseline specification  0.338***  0.398***  0.281***  0.140**  0.186**  0.100 
+ ed. policy controls  0.324***  0.377***  0.277***  0.175**  0.223**  0.131* 
+ econ. controls, trends  0.333***  0.416***  0.271**  0.129*  0.157**  0.101 
Baseline - non-reformers  0.420***  0.490***  0.357***  0.119  0.168  0.072 
(C) Basic math 
           
Baseline specification  0.137  0.184*  0.105  0.103**  0.091  0.116** 
+ ed. policy controls  0.155*  0.197**  0.129  0.085*  0.073  0.099* 
+ econ. controls, trends  0.131  0.250**  0.025  0.088*  0.068  0.109** 
Baseline - non-reformers  0.216**  0.216**  0.211*  0.064  0.052  0.078 
(D) Advanced math 
           
Baseline specification  0.201*  0.214*  0.177  0.038  0.095  -0.016 
+ ed. policy controls  0.169  0.180  0.147  0.090  0.149  0.032 
+ econ. controls, trends  0.202  0.167  0.246*  0.041  0.089  -0.008 
Baseline - non-reformers  0.204  0.274*  0.146  0.055  0.115  -0.006 
              N  11,850  5,470  6,380  54,000  26,640  27,360 
              Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state (* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01). Each coefficient comes from a 
separate regression of completed coursework on a math reform indicator. All regressions include state and class fixed effects and a 
gender indicator. The baseline specification, used throughout panel (A), includes no other controls. The second specification adds state-
level measures of non-math course requirements and an indicator for an exit exam requirement, as well as statewide expenditures per 
student and student-teacher ratios. The third specification adds state-level unemployment and poverty rates in the year of high school 
graduation, as well as Census division-specific linear time trends. The fourth specification is the baseline specification but omits those 
states that had not enacted reforms by 1990. Sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 to comply with the NCES restricted-use data 
license. Table 5: Impact on Math Coursework, by School Type 
             
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
All  Black  Black  All  White  White 
   blacks  males  females  whites  males  females 
(A) By school racial composition 
            Math reform * white school  0.176  0.247**  0.130  0.111  0.156*  0.072 
 
(0.107)  (0.120)  (0.128)  (0.069)  (0.081)  (0.069) 
Math reform * non-white school  0.353***  0.410***  0.298***  0.187***  0.237***  0.141** 
 
(0.098)  (0.123)  (0.090)  (0.065)  (0.076)  (0.067) 
Non-white school  -0.162*  -0.159*  -0.140  -0.072*  -0.077*  -0.067 
 
(0.090)  (0.086)  (0.123)  (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.041) 
R2  0.109  0.118  0.109  0.097  0.087  0.113 
(B) By school sector 
            Math reform * public school  0.338***  0.391***  0.287***  0.163**  0.201**  0.130** 
 
(0.093)  (0.117)  (0.086)  (0.065)  (0.077)  (0.062) 
Math reform * private school  0.127  0.281*  0.045  0.022  0.062  -0.026 
 
(0.116)  (0.155)  (0.170)  (0.076)  (0.099)  (0.079) 
Public school  -0.477***  -0.519***  -0.430***  -0.440***  -0.491***  -0.402*** 
 
(0.083)  (0.107)  (0.106)  (0.047)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
R2  0.118  0.130  0.116  0.114  0.107  0.128 
              N  11,850  5,470  6,380  54,000  26,640  27,360 
              Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state (* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01). Each coefficient 
comes from a separate regression of completed coursework on a math reform indicator interacted with school type. 
In panel (A), white schools are those in which more than 80% of transcripts were collected from white students. All 
regressions include state and class fixed effects and a gender indicator. Sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 10 to 
comply with the NCES restricted-use data license. 
 
   Table 6: Reduced Form Impact of Math Reforms on Ln(Annual Earnings) 
             
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
All  Black  Black  All  White  White 
   blacks  males  females  whites  males  females 
Baseline specification  0.026***  0.032***  0.022***  0.006  0.016  -0.004 
 
(0.007)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.005) 
+ ed. policy controls  0.021***  0.028***  0.017*  0.008  0.015*  0.002 
 
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
+ econ. controls, trends  0.015**  0.021***  0.010  0.004  0.008  0.000 
 
(0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
              N  163,972  73,629  90,343  1,200,052  642,758  557,294 
              Baseline - non-reformers  0.019**  0.019*  0.019*  0.004  0.004  0.004 
 
(0.007)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
N  135,849  60,959  74,890  876,461  470,352  406,109 
              Baseline, transcript classes  0.031***  0.036**  0.029**  0.005  0.011  -0.002 
 
(0.010)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
N  49,361  21,945  27,416  368,252  196,768  171,484 
              Baseline, with dropouts  0.026***  0.027***  0.026***  0.009  0.019*  -0.002 
 
(0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.005) 
N  188,756  87,534  101,222  1,296,571  708,157  588,414 
              Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state (* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01). Each 
coefficient comes from a separate regression of the logarithm of annual earnings on a math reform 
indicator. All regressions include state and class fixed effects and a gender indicator. The first four 
specifications are the same as those in Table 4. The fifth specification includes only the classes of 1982, 
1987, 1990 and 1994. The sixth specification includes high school dropouts. 
 
   Table 7: Impact of Math Coursework on Ln(Annual Earnings) 
             
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 
All  Black  Black  All  White  White 
   blacks  males  females  whites  males  females 
Baseline specification  0.079***  0.083***  0.078***  0.049  0.089  -0.030 
 
(0.021)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.052)  (0.061)  (0.048) 
+ ed. policy controls  0.066***  0.075***  0.059*  0.051  0.068*  0.020 
 
(0.021)  (0.021)  (0.031)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.047) 
+ econ. controls, trends  0.045**  0.052***  0.035  0.033  0.051  0.005 
 
(0.017)  (0.018)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.041) 
Baseline - non-reformers  0.045**  0.041*  0.050*  0.040  0.031  0.067 
 
(0.018)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.027)  (0.082) 
Baseline, transcript classes  0.093***  0.091**  0.103**  0.042  0.069  -0.004 
 
(0.030)  (0.035)  (0.047)  (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.085) 
Baseline, with dropouts  0.079***  0.070***  0.091***  0.068  0.108*  -0.011 
   (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.030)  (0.053)  (0.062)  (0.048) 
              Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state (* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** 
p<.01). Each coefficient comes from a separate two-sample IV regression of the logarithm of 
annual earnings on estimated math coursework. The specifications are the same as those 
used in Table 6. 
 
   Table 8: Impact of Reforms on Education, Labor Force Attachment, and Occupational Skill 
                     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Outcome  Black males  Black females  White males  White females 
(A) Full sample 
                High school dropout  -0.004  0.008  -0.005  0.001  -0.005**  -0.001  0.001  0.003 
 
(0.006)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
High school graduate  -0.010  -0.006  -0.006  0.003  0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
College, no degree  0.006  -0.007  0.009  -0.003  0.002  -0.003  0.004  -0.001 
 
(0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
College degree  0.008**  0.005  0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.005  -0.007*  -0.001 
 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
                  N  121,203  100,234  140,595  116,864  784,855  580,940  795,065  589,373 
                  (B) High school graduates 
                Positive earnings  0.004  -0.008  -0.005  -0.008  -0.001  0.000  -0.017**  0.001 
 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
Employed  0.005  0.005  -0.006  -0.015  0.003  0.001  -0.015**  0.004 
 
(0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
                  N  93,439  77,291  116,320  96,339  699,458  511,899  729,981  536,065 
                  (C) Positive earnings 
                Skilled  0.009  0.007  0.000  -0.001  0.001  0.004  0.003  -0.001 
 
(0.007)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Occupational math skill  0.012  0.007  0.002  0.007  -0.000  0.004  0.003  -0.002 
 
(0.010)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
                  Observations  72,614  60,073  90,159  74,738  639,688  467,817  557,289  406,057 
                  Exclude non-reformers     X     X     X     X 
                  Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state (* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01). Each coefficient 
comes from a separate regression of the outcome on a math reform indicator. All regressions include state and class 
fixed effects and a gender indicator. Even-numbered columns omit states that had not enacted reforms by 1990. 
 
 Table 9: Impact of Reforms on Ln(Annual Earnings), by Education 
                     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Black males  Black females  White males  White females 
(A) Full sample 
                Math reform (baseline)  0.028***  0.014  0.026***  0.014  0.020*  0.005  -0.001  0.004 
 
(0.009)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
                  Math reform (+ ed./exp. controls)  0.019**  0.014  0.016**  0.011  0.011  0.004  -0.005  0.004 
 
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
                  Math reform * HS dropout  -0.003  0.003  0.025  -0.008  0.018  -0.018  0.005  0.005 
 
(0.013)  (0.014)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.019) 
Math reform * HS graduate  0.036***  0.024  0.013  0.018  0.021  -0.001  0.004  0.000 
 
(0.012)  (0.024)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Math reform * college, no degree  0.015  0.010  0.005  -0.004  0.015  0.011  -0.004  0.000 
 
(0.017)  (0.028)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.011) 
Math reform * college degree  0.013  0.010  0.029**  0.028  -0.002  0.010  -0.011  0.009 
 
(0.017)  (0.023)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
                  N  87,601  72,587  101,256  84,250  709,708  524,359  588,828  431,618 
(B) HS graduates 
                Math reform (baseline)  0.033***  0.020*  0.022***  0.018*  0.017  0.005  -0.003  0.005 
 
(0.009)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
                  Math reform (+ ed./exp. controls)  0.026***  0.018*  0.015**  0.016  0.011  0.004  -0.006  0.004 
 
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
                  Math reform * HS graduate  0.038***  0.025  0.013  0.020  0.021  -0.005  0.003  0.000 
 
(0.012)  (0.025)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Math reform * college, no degree  0.018  0.012  0.005  -0.002  0.015  0.008  -0.005  0.000 
 
(0.015)  (0.027)  (0.012)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Math reform * college degree  0.014  0.011  0.029**  0.030  -0.001  0.007  -0.011*  0.009 
 
(0.015)  (0.021)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
                  N  73,691  61,011  90,375  74,916  644,262  471,343  557,703  406,377 
                  Exclude non-reformers     X     X     X     X 
                  Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state (* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01). Panel (A) includes the full sample, while 
panel (B) excludes high school dropouts. Each column in each panel shows three regressions, all of which include state and class fixed 
effects and a gender indicator. The first regression shows the impact of the math reform on earnings. The second adds education and 
experience controls as described in the text. The third includes those controls and interacts the reform with education levels. Even-
numbered columns omit states that had not enacted reforms by 1990. 
 
 Table 10: Impact of Math Reforms on Racial Gaps 
                     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   Math courses  Advanced math  Ln(earnings)  Occ. math skill 
(A) Males 
               
Math reform  0.187**  0.186*  0.090  0.088  0.009  0.000  -0.001  -0.004 
 
(0.071)  (0.100)  (0.094)  (0.134)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Math reform * black  0.144**  0.182**  0.118  0.214**  0.038***  0.042***  0.028***  0.045*** 
 
(0.068)  (0.068)  (0.098)  (0.104)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Black  -0.216***  -0.253***  -0.712***  -0.808***  -0.216***  -0.222***  -0.130***  -0.147*** 
 
(0.059)  (0.061)  (0.080)  (0.091)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
R2  0.089  0.094  0.084  0.087  0.163  0.159  0.136  0.136 
N  32,113  26,035  32,113  26,035  717,953  532,354  712,302  527,890 
(B) Females 
               
Math reform  0.125**  0.114  0.006  -0.000  -0.001  0.008  0.001  -0.008 
 
(0.060)  (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.119)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Math reform * black  0.019  0.064  0.079  0.112  -0.021***  -0.015**  0.020**  0.036*** 
 
(0.069)  (0.072)  (0.103)  (0.120)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
Black  -0.094  -0.143**  -0.613***  -0.651***  -0.011  -0.018  -0.133***  -0.149*** 
 
(0.061)  (0.064)  (0.082)  (0.106)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
R2  0.107  0.117  0.089  0.090  0.150  0.148  0.031  0.033 
N  33,735  27,093  33,735  27,093  648,078  481,293  647,448  480,795 
                  Exclude non-reformers     X     X     X     X 
                  Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state (* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01). The 
entire table includes only high school graduates. Each column in each panel shows a regression of the 
outcome on the variables listed, as well as state and class fixed effects, and a full set of education and 
experience controls in columns (5)-(8).  Even-numbered columns omit states that had not enacted 
reforms by 1990. 
 